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IS BASEBALL SHROUDED IN COLLUSION ONCE
MORE? ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD THAT
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE FREE AGENT
MARKET WILL LEAD TO ANTITRUST LIABILITY
FOR MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL’S OWNERS
Connor Mulry*
ABSTRACT
This Note examines how Major League Baseball’s (MLB) current free
agent system is restraining trade despite the existence of the league’s
non-statutory labor exemption from antitrust. The league’s players
have seen their percentage share of earnings decrease even as league
revenues have reached an all-time high. This reality is due to the
players’ inability to “cash-in” when their market value hits its apex.
Once these players enter the open market, their value has greatly
deteriorated and consequently, they are unable to generate earnings
commensurate with their value to the league.
This Note first explores the progression of MLB’s exemption from
antitrust before briefly examining the history of the sport’s reserve
clause. This Note then chronicles free agency’s inception, its
subsequent development, the league’s brushes with collusion over the
past several decades, and how the Curt Flood Act has critically peeled
back the sport’s antitrust exemption. Finally, it demonstrates how the
current system of free agency is restraining trade before positing that
the pursuit of antitrust litigation is the optimal measure players can
turn to in order to combat the current state of the free agent market.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 19, 2019, Los Angeles Angels superstar center-fielder
Mike Trout signed the most lucrative contract in sports history,
guaranteeing him more than $430 million over a twelve-year span.1 While
Trout is considered one of the greatest players of his generation—and to
many, one of the greatest to ever play the sport—this is undeniably a large
sum of money.2 The contract was an extension of his current commitment

1. Anthony Wintrado, Mike Trout Signs A Record-Breaking Extension With The
Angels, FORBES (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonywitrado/
2019/03/19/mike-trout-signs-a-record-breaking-extension-with-theangels/#3ef4c031686c [https://perma.cc/DN5R-6U94].
2. See generally Dale Murphy, I played against some of the all-time greats. Mike
Trout is better than all of them, THE ATHLETIC (April 23, 2019), https://theathletic.com/
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with the Angels–the club Trout has played for since he was drafted into
the league at eighteen years-old.3 With merely two years left on his
contract, Trout was close to hitting the market where he would have had
the opportunity to sign with the highest bidder for his services. On the
market, he would have been one of the most sought-after commodities in
the history of the sport.4 Instead, Trout joined the long list of established
players in Major League Baseball (MLB) who have erred on the side of
caution by securing their futures with their current employers.5 When
asked why he chose to secure his future before reaching that point, Trout
cited the slow progression of the free-agent market during the 2018–2019
off-season as being a major reason for his decision.6
During the 2019 off-season, Manny Machado and Bryce Harper—
two of baseball’s biggest stars—were slated to be highly-coveted free
agents.7 With both players entering the 2019–2020 season at only twentysix years-old and with multiple productive seasons under their belts,8 it
938406/2019/04/23/dale-murphy-i-played-against-some-of-the-all-time-greats-miketrout-is-better-than-all-of-them/ [https://perma.cc/V53K-7X85].
3. Complete 2009 Draft Results, ESPN, http:/www.espn.com/mlb/draft2009/
news/story?id=4246340 [https://perma.cc/MTK8-CK7U] (last visited Aug. 11, 2019).
4. See Mike Axisa, MLB Hot Stoce: Why a Mike Trout free agent bidding war
could’ve topped $600M, CBS SPORTS (Nov. 10, 2017) https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/
news/mlb-hot-stove-why-a-mike-trout-free-agent-bidding-war-couldve-topped-600m/
[https://perma.cc/8GMH-PF2D].
5. See generally Gabe Lacques, Panic or pragmatism? Breaking down MLB’s $1.7
billion flurry of contract extensions, USA TODAY (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/columnist/gabe-lacques/2019/03/28/mlbcontract-extensions-free-agency-salaries/3287684002 [https://perma.cc/8W5X-JXVE].
6. Fabian Ardaya, Inside the conversations and texts that convinced Mike Trout to
become an “Angel for life,” THE ATHLETIC (Mar. 25, 2019), https://theathletic.com/
886221/2019/03/25/the-conversations-and-texts-that-convinced-mike-trout-to-becomean-angel-for-life [https://perma.cc/58DB-DDEP] (“Trout realized even he might not be
safe from the current state of baseball free agency and club spending on the open
market.”).
7. Id.
8. See Victor Mather, How Good is Manny Machado?, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/17/sports/manny-machado-trade.html
[https://perma.cc/DS29-AN2N] (“Make no mistake, Machado is a bona fide star. He has
four All-Star selections in his six full seasons and has put up consistent numbers with
only one significant stretch on the sidelines.”); see also Scott Miller, Bryce Harper
Rejected $300M, but Is He Really a Generational Superstar Anymore? BLEACHER
REPORT (Dec. 4, 2018), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2808604-bryce-harperrejected-300m-but-is-he-really-a-generational-superstar-anymore
[https://perma.cc/NL6H-JD8N] (“There is no doubt in my mind that he is a bona fide,
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was presumed within the industry that both players would have suitors
lining up to pursue them.9 However, fewer teams than anticipated vied for
their services.10 The absence of serious pursuit from multiple teams for
two of the game’s transcendent talents has emblemized the notion that the
current free agent system in the MLB is broken, and may lead to another
prolonged labor dispute for the sport.11
Machado and Harper eventually signed long-term deals,12 but other
marquee players in the sport have not been so lucky.13 Free agents,
including pitchers Dallas Keuchel and Craig Kimbrel, remained unsigned
well into the 2019 season despite having tremendous track records of
success.14 The situation these free agents have found themselves in is
puzzling to many within the industry because while revenue for the MLB
is at an all-time high, salaries for its players actually decreased in 2018.15
elite competitive advantage in today’s game.”) (quoting Minnesota Twins General
Manager Thad Levine).
9. See generally Jon Tayler, A Case for Every Team to Sign Bryce Harper, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.si.com/mlb/2018/11/13/bryce-harper-freeagency-yankees-cubs-red-sox-dodgers-nationals [https://perma.cc/D2LU-VN8E].
10. See Michael Powell, Why Isn’t Anyone Bidding for Bryce Harper and Manny
Machado?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/
sports/baseball/harper-machado-baseball.html [https://perma.cc/9MEP-YLXA] (“At a
time of the off-season when the best free agents typically would have already signed
handsome new contracts, most club-owners have tucked away their wallets and claimed
to need no more talent.”).
11. See generally Ken Rosenthal, The slow market for Harper and Machado is
another sign that baseball’s current system is broken, THE ATHLETIC (Jan. 4, 2019),
https://theathletic.com/748860/2019/01/04/rosenthal-the-slow-market-for-harper-andmachado-is-another-sign-that-baseballs-current-system-is-broken/
[https://perma.cc/3LBZ-8RSD].
12. See Nick Friend, Many Machado: Record $300m deal agreed, according to
Reports, CNN (Feb, 22, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/20/sport/mannymachado-san-diego-padres-deal-spt-intl/index.html
[https://perma.cc/3TPD-7CRW];
Todd Zolecki, Harper, Phils agrees to 13-year deal, MLB.com (Mar. 2, 2019),
https://www.mlb.com/news/bryce-harper-deal-with-phillies
[https://perma.cc/SD4KC2QX].
13. See generally, Powell, supra note 10.
14. See generally Michael Baumann, There’s No Explanation for Why Dallas
Keuchel and Craig Kimbrel Remain Unsigned, THE RINGER (April 16, 2019),
https://www.theringer.com/mlb/2019/4/16/18320329/dallas-keuchel-craig-kimbrelunsigned-red-sox-brewers-nationals-mets-cubs-phillies
[https://perma.cc/7EHXAW2K].
15. See generally Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record Revenues Of $10.3 Billion For
2018,
FORBES
(Jan.
7,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown

2019]

IS BASEBALL SHROUDED
IN COLLUSION ONCE MORE?

277

This decline is likely a result of the free-agent market simply not proving
as fruitful for players as in years past.
This reality has led to speculation that MLB’s club-owners are
colluding by implicitly refusing to get into bidding wars for players’
services.16 In theory, doing so would discourage players from pursuing
free agency in order to retain their teams’ talent at more favorable rates.17
Collusion—which is prohibited by federal law18—is generally defined as
any collective action that restricts competition.19 This would not be the
first time MLB’s club-owners have been faced with collusion charges.20
The number of “labor-management disputes have arisen more in [the
MLB] than in any other major professional sport played in the United
States, particularly since the advent of collective bargaining in the past
three decades.”21
Professional teams in the MLB have enjoyed a special non-statutory
labor exemption from antitrust law since 1922.22 The non-statutory labor
exemption is permissible in United States professional sports because of
the “peculiar nature of the labor-management relations in the industry.”23
/2019/01/07/mlb-sees-record-revenues-of-10-3-billion-for-2018/#340c79c35be
[https://perma.cc/PWT9-TUDF]; see also Gabe Lacques, Panic or pragmatism?
Breaking down MLB’s $1.7 billion flurry of contract extensions, HERALD-MAIL MEDIA
(Mar.
28,
2019),
https://www.heraldmailmedia.com/news/usa_today/panic-orpragmatism-breaking-down-mlb-s-billion-flurry-of/article_18424271-e380-56f2-8aef379942f5efe6.html [https://perma.cc/T8M4-WUS3] (“As their share of baseball’s
revenue pie continues to shrink, and methods to suppress their earnings proliferate, 22
emerging or established Major League Baseball stars waved something that looked like
a white flag this spring.”).
16. See generally Jonah Kerri, Barry Bonds’ former agent says MLB owners are
colluding against players to suppress salaries, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 14, 2019),
https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/barry-bonds-former-agent-says-mlb-owners-arecolluding-against-players-to-suppress-salaries/
[https://perma.cc/8SDP-QVJX?type=image].
17. Id.
18. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-38 (2012).
19. Darren A. Heitner & Jillian Postal, What If Kaepernick Is Correct?: A Look at
the Collusion Criteria in Professional Sports, 9 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 157, 158
(2018).
20. See Jeffrey S. Moorad, Major League Baseball’s Labor Turmoil: The Failure of
the Counter-Revolution, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 53, 69 (1997).
21. Id. at 53–54.
22. See Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200 (1922).
23. Heitner & Postal, supra note 19, at 163.
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Sports leagues are asked to promulgate rules that will level the playing
field among competitors—such as barring players of a certain age from
participating in a sport, or preventing the relocation of a franchise—
frequently to the detriment of teams and individual competitors.24 But if
any sports league is incapable of establishing such rules, their ability to
remain competitive would be near impossible.25 Due to this reality,
lawsuits from baseball players that claim antitrust violations are
exceedingly rare. Instead, players have attempted to settle cases where
club-owners have exhibited purposeful anti-competitive practices through
grievance proceedings or private negotiations.26
Pursuing antitrust litigation in the wake of the 2019 off-season may
be a superior alternative to filing for grievances and/or private
proceedings. This Note posits that contemporary free agency in baseball
is restraining trade by preventing players from capitalizing on their
market value at the point in their careers at which market value peaks.
This restraint of trade has created an imbalance too great for club-owners
to avoid under the non-statutory exemption.
Part I of this Note explores the progression of MLB’s exemption
from antitrust before briefly examining the history of the sport’s reserve
clause. Part II chronicles free agency’s inception, subsequent
development, and brushes with collusion over the past several decades.
Finally, Part II discusses how the Curt Flood Act (CFA) has critically
peeled back the sport’s antitrust exemption. Finally, Part III analyzes how
free agency is restraining trade and argues that antitrust litigation is the
optimal measure the players can turn to in order to combat the current
state of the free-agent market.

24. See Mark C. Anderson, Self-Regulation and League Rules Under the Sherman
Act, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 125 (2002).
25. See Grant Brisbee, Noah Syndergaard, George Springer, and Playing Around
with
Service
Time,
SB
NATION
(Mar.
21,
2014),
https://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2014/3/21/5531100/noah-syndergaard-george-springerTHE-SYSTEM [https://perma.cc/V7HF-7F7B] (discussing service time and instances of
service time manipulation as necessary evils of competitive balance).
26. See infra Part II.
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I. HOW THE MLB HAS HISTORICALLY ESCAPED ANTITRUST
LIABILITY & BASEBALL’S RESERVE SYSTEM
The recognition of baseball as one of America’s most cherished
cultural staples has not been lost on the American legal system. Some
legal commentators believe that the sport’s popularity enabled it to
originally escape antitrust liability.27 Yet, the exemption remains despite
the weakening of its authority that came as a result of a case brought by
outfielder Curt Flood.28
A. THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (the “Sherman Act”) is the main
governing statute responsible for regulating the MLB’s otherwise broad
autonomy in molding some of its anti-competitive practices.29
Specifically, the first two provisions, often referred to as Sherman I30 and
Sherman II,31 purport to enable unrestricted competition amongst
businesses.
Sherman II prohibits any sort of conduct that attempts to monopolize
interstate commerce.32 For the purposes of this Note, Sherman II
violations will not be discussed, as they are not relevant in situations
involving sports leagues for reasons discussed infra Part I.C.
Under Sherman I, it is illegal to conspire to contract in a way that
unreasonably restrains trade in interstate commerce.33 However, not all
contracts that restrain interstate commerce are illegal, just contracts that
27. See Shayna M. Sigman, The Jurisprudence of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis,
15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 277, 295–96 (2005) (arguing that despite Judge Kennesaw
Mountain Landis’s reputation as a “trust buster,” his desire to “save the sport he loved”
prevented him from ruling that Baseball was engaged in antitrust activity in Federal
League v. Organized Baseball).
28. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-38 (2012).
30. Id. at § 1. (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal.”).
31. Id. at § 2. (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a felony . . . .”).
32. Id.
33. See Anderson, supra note 24, at 127.
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are found to be unreasonable.34 To determine whether any particular
restraint is unreasonable under the federal antitrust laws, a court will
generally apply one of the following two approaches: (a) per se test or (b)
rule of reason test.35
Restraints analyzed under the per se rule are those that are always so
inherently anticompetitive and damaging to the market that they do not
require further inquiry into their effects on the market or the existence of
an objective competitive justification.36 If it is not apparent that this
situation exists, the rule of reason test is applied. “The focus of an inquiry
under the [r]ule of [r]eason is whether the restraint imposed is justified by
legitimate business purposes, and is no more restrictive than necessary.”37
To establish a Section 1 violation of the Sherman Act, a party must prove
two elements: (1) a conspiracy, and (2) an unreasonable restraint of
trade.38 Sports leagues are considered to be joint ventures, which are
entities that rely on the success of their members to profit.39 Since joint
ventures are reliant upon the success of their members to be profitable,
they are permitted to engage in practices—such as price fixing and wage
restraints—that might otherwise be illegal under Sherman I.40
B. ORIGINS OF BASEBALL’S RESERVE SYSTEM
Baseball became a legitimate business in the United States when the
National League was formed in 1876.41 The National League was a
denominated major league that was eventually united through the
National Agreement with another major league named the American
League, that collectively formed the National Association of Professional

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 128.
See Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 1976).
See U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620.
See Heitner & Postal, supra note 19, at 159.
See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 619.
See Texaco Inc. v. Dahger, 547 U.S. 1 (2006) (deciding that two oil companies’
production and marketing joint venture, to sell separately branded gasoline to service
station club-owners at same price, was not per se illegal horizontal price fixing
agreement, as companies were not competing in relevant market.)
41. See Joshua P. Jones, A Congressional Swing and Miss: The Curt Flood Act,
Player Control, and the National Pastime, 33 GA. L. REV. 639, 644 (1999).
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Baseball Leagues.42 The league consisted of a large number of minor
leagues of professional baseball in addition to the major leagues, which
attracted superior players.43
Before the merger with the American League, however, the league’s
preliminary club-owners reached a “secret agreement to ‘reserve’ up to
five players per team who would become bound to their current employer
[which persisted past the merger].”44 This agreement eventually extended
“to include all players in their league.”45 This clause essentially enabled
clubs to hold on to players for all ensuing seasons on a perpetual basis.46
The economic effect of this “reserve system” was “entirely to the
club-owners’ advantage.”47 Under this system, players were hardly
capable of negotiating their salaries and thus benefited little from the
game’s increasing revenues.48 Player salaries barely increased from the
1900s through the 1960s, “even as club-owners were becoming
increasingly wealthy.”49
C. BASEBALL’S NON-STATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION FROM THE
SHERMAN ACT
Club-owners are able to manipulate the market for a player’s services
because the MLB is virtually immune from antitrust liability. This
immunity arose through a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions.
The first major case that questioned the extent to which the league
could be held liable for antitrust violations was Federal Baseball Club of

42. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs v. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, 269
F. 681, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1920), aff’d sub nom. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat’l
League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 2000 (1922).
43. Id.
44. See Marc Edelman, Moving Past Collusion in Major League Baseball: Healing
Old Wounds, and Preventing New Ones, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 601, 605 (2008).
45. Id.
46. See Noah J. Goodman, The Evolution and Decline of Free Agency in Major
League Baseball: How the 2012-2016 Collective Bargaining Agreement Is Restraining
Trade, 23 SPORTS L. J. 19, 23 (2016) (noting that the National League club-owners
colluded to establish a reserve clause—one that gave them the ability to unilaterally
renew a player’s contract into the next season).
47. See Edelman, supra note 44.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.50 The
Federal League was a competing baseball league that at one point was
comprised of eight independent teams.51 By 1915, however, Baltimore
was home to the only club in the Federal League.52 The rest of the clubs
had been bought out by either the National or American Leagues—these
two leagues went on to become the MLB.53
The Baltimore club, however, refused to be bought out and asserted
that the National and American leagues were monopolizing the industry
through their aggressive buyout strategies, and were thus violating
antitrust laws.54 Its claims were ultimately unsuccessful, as the Court
reasoned that the sport’s exhibitions were strictly the affairs of the state
in which they were being played.55 This rationalization prevented the
National and American Leagues from falling under the jurisdiction of
federal law under Sherman I even if a restraint of trade had been found,
and thus, resulted in the birth of baseball’s non-statutory antitrust labor
exemption.56
The exemption remained intact and faced little resistance for the next
three decades. However, the MLB was eventually faced with another
Sherman Act challenge in 1953.57 George Toolson, a minor league pitcher
for the New York Yankees, refused to accept an assignment to the
Yankees’ minor league team in Binghamton, New York.58 His refusal
resulted in his placement on the ineligible list, which prohibited him from
joining any other Major League club and effectively forced him to remain
50. See Nathaniel Grow, The Curiously Confounding Curt Flood Act, 90 TUL. L.
REV. 859, 865 (2016) (stating that “baseball’s antitrust exemption dates back to the
Supreme Court’s 1922 decision in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs”).
51. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200, 207 (1922).
52. See Grow, supra note 50.
53. Id.
54. See Fed. Baseball Club, 259 U.S. at 207 (The plaintiff asserted that the
defendants, by buying up some of the constituent clubs and inducing all of them except
plaintiff to leave the Federal League with assistance by the Federal League president
defendant, took part in the conspiracy.).
55. Id. at 208–09.
56. Id.
57. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357–58 (1953)
(comparing the antitrust issues in question to those presented to the Court before in
Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs).
58. See Goodman, supra note 46, at 30.
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in the Yankees organization.59 Toolson challenged the league under the
Sherman Act, but the Supreme Court rejected his claim.60
The Supreme Court interpreted Congress’ inaction in the aftermath
of Federal Baseball Club as demonstrating a desire to keep the MLB
exempt from antitrust laws.61 The Court held that “stare decisis concerns
warranted maintaining baseball’s antitrust immunity because the MLB
had ‘been left for thirty years to develop, on the understanding that it was
not subject to existing antitrust legislation.’”62
Nearly two decades would pass before there was another challenge
to the sport’s antitrust exemption. In October 1969, the St. Louis
Cardinals traded Curt Flood to the Philadelphia Phillies, leading to
another attack on the exemption’s validity.63 Flood objected to the trade
and asked to be proclaimed a free agent so that he could instead sign with
a team of his choice.64 When the league refused, Flood filed a lawsuit
challenging the reserve clause in his contract under the Sherman Act.65
The District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the
reserve system’s legal invalidity stemmed from a forced restraint of trade
through his inability to choose his place of employment.66
In its decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[p]rofessional
baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate commerce,” thus
effectively repudiating the underlying basis of the Federal Baseball Club
decision, which held that the sport was an intra-state enterprise.67 The
Court also admitted that baseball’s antitrust immunity was an “exception
and an anomaly” and decided to retain the exemption.68 Consequently, the
antitrust exemption’s legal validity remained, but cracks in its foundation,
which had previously been perceived as impregnable, began to surface.
59.
60.
61.

See id.
See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
Id. (explaining that the Court was hesitant to overturn its 1922 decision in light
of the fact that “Congress has had the ruling under consideration but has not seen fit to
bring such business under these laws by legislation having prospective effect.”).
62. Id.
63. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 265 (1972).
64. Id.
65. Grow, supra note 50, at 868. Flood additionally claimed the reserve system
violated the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery.
66. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (“By way of relief
plaintiff seeks a declaration of the illegality of baseball’s reserve system, an injunction
restraining defendants from agreeing among themselves to refuse him employment.”).
67. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 273.
68. Id. at 282.
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II. THE BEGINNINGS OF FREE AGENCY & THE INABILITY OF PLAYERS
TO AVOID BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
While Major League players failed to rid themselves of the reserve
clause in the Flood litigation they were able to secure the right to free
agency within a few years after the decision by relying on collective
bargaining and labor arbitration.69 Securing this right was in large part due
to the efforts of the Major League Baseball Players Association
(MLBPA), which was becoming increasingly influential.70 By
establishing free agency, the players fleshed out new rights for themselves
that strengthened their position against the club-owners’ previously
limitless autocratic system of player control.71 Despite this development
of new rights for the players, manipulation of their services continued.72
A. FORMATION OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL’S
PLAYERS ASSOCIATION
The players laid the groundwork for the MLBPA’s formation in
1954,73 before it became a “fully functioning union” in the 1960s.74 The
players hired chief economist Marvin Miller as their executive director in
1966.75 Miller wanted to employ the league’s grievance arbitration and
collective bargaining “to challenge the game’s reserve system.”76
In 1974, Miller encouraged two players—Andy Messersmith and
Dave McNally—not to sign new contracts for the 1975 season but to
instead make their teams exercise the “option clause” in their previous
contracts, which required the players to play the following season under
the previous year’s terms.77 After Messersmith and McNally played one
year under the option clause, Miller believed the players would no longer
be bound by the reserve system.78 Baseball’s neutral arbitrator ultimately
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Grow, supra note 50, at 869.
Edelman, supra note 44, at 605.
Id. at 608.
Id. at 608, 610.
See id. at 605. (“Originally founded in 1954 to represent the players’ pension
interests.”)
74. Id. at 605.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 606.
77. See Susan H. Seabury, The Development and Role of Free Agency in Major
League Baseball, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 335, 352–53 (1999).
78. See Edelman, supra note 44, at 607.
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agreed with Miller, Messersmith, and McNally much to the chagrin of
MLB’s club-owners.79 Previously, the club-owners assumed they could
perpetually renew the right to maintain a player previously under contract
by exercising the option clause at any time.80
Unsurprisingly, the club-owners decided to challenge the decision
which eventually made its way to the 8th Circuit.81 In Kansas City Royals
Baseball Corp. v. MLB Player’s Ass’n,82 the club-owners were
unsuccessful in seeking to have the arbitration panel’s decision
overturned.83 The court held that since the club-owners and players
collectively bargained to establish an arbitration panel, the “MLB derived
its jurisdictional authority from the [Basic] [A]greement.”84 Therefore,
the club-owners had approved the authority of the arbitration panel by
supporting the establishment of the Basic Agreement and its dispute
mechanisms.85 The decision of the Court brought forth the age of free
agency in Major League Baseball.86
B. FREE AGENCY & EARLY INSTANCES OF COLLUSION
Initially, free agency was a boon for the league’s players.87 Members
of the MLBPA were mostly satisfied with its implementation, which
resulted in both an increase in players’ salaries and much greater freedom
of movement.88 The Basic Agreement also included language that
specified how players and teams could conduct themselves in free agency
through the 1976 Basic Agreement between the MLBPA and the clubowners.89 Namely, the 1976 Basic Agreement established the “Individual
79.
80.
81.

See id. at 606–07.
See id. at 607.
Goodman, supra note 46, at 37; Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. MLB
Player’s Ass’n, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
82. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 532 F.2d at 615.
83. See id. at 616, 629 (noting that “[t]he 1968 agreement clearly permitted the
arbitration of grievances relating to the reserve system. It, therefore, cannot be said that
the Club Owners never consented to the arbitration of such grievances.”).
84. Goodman, supra note 46, at 37.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See Edelman, supra note 44, at 610 (“During the first ten years of baseball free
agency, the average MLB player salary increased from $50,000 per year to over $370,000
per year.”).
88. See id. at 608.
89. See id.
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Nature of Rights.” Originally drafted as Article XVIII, Section H, the
“Individual Nature of Rights” clause of the 1976 Basic Agreement stated:
The utilization or non-utilization of [free agency shall be] an
individual matter to be determined solely by each Player and Club for
his or its own benefit. [With regard to free agency], Players may not
act in concert with other Players, and Clubs may not act in concert
with other Clubs.90

Without explicitly stating it, the “Individual Nature of Rights” clause
foreclosed the opportunity to engage in collusive behavior.91 Despite the
prohibition of collusion, the market for free agents inextricably dried up
in 1985.92 Owners who were previously known to spend vast amounts of
money to secure free agents on the open market began “praising the merits
of ‘fiscal responsibility’” and thereby focused on retaining the players on
their respective teams.93
During the 1985–1986 off-season, players no longer had any
legitimate opportunities to move to new clubs.94 Consequently, players
remained with their current clubs on new contracts for “lesser sums and
fewer years than desired.”95 Once the players and agents realized that the
club-owners were likely colluding,96 the MLBPA decided to file a
collusion grievance (“Collusion I”).97 The grievance was filed on behalf
of the 139 players “purportedly harmed by collusion during the 1985–86
offseason.”98 The MLBPA contended that the club-owners’ refusal to
pursue players on opposing teams equated to a boycott in the market for
free agents once it was undertaken by two or more teams. They argued
that this constituted an illegal “concerted action” under Article XVIII(H)
90.
91.

Id.
See Ryan M. Rodenberg & Justin M. Lovich, Reverse Collusion, 4 HARV. J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 191, 197 (2013) (“The individual nature of the free agency structure
would guarantee that owners could no longer collectively agree to artificially restrict the
baseball labor market as they had done throughout the 1900s.”).
92. See Stephen L. Willis, A Critical Perspective of Baseball’s Collusion Decisions,
1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 109, 125 (1991).
93. Heitner & Postal, supra note 19, at 171–72.
94. See Edelman, supra note 44, at 611.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 611 (“As of New Years Day 1986, not a single free agent player
received an offer that induced his changing teams.”).
97. Id. at 613.
98. Id.
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of the Basic Agreement,99 “so long as the teams’ actions exhibited a
common purpose or goal.”100
Before Collusion I was decided, the MLBPA filed a second
grievance (“Collusion II”)101 due to the similarly slow progression of the
free agent market ensuing off-season. Of all seventy-nine free agents
available in the 1986–1987 off-season, the MLBPA alleged that none of
the players received a bona fide offer from any club besides their former
club—until at least the former team declared its lack of interest or became
ineligible to sign the player under other free agency provisions.102 The
MLBPA also argued that no eligible free agent had offers from two or
more clubs at any one time.103
Andre Dawson, a free agent all-star outfielder, emblemized how far
the clubs had gone in refusing to work against one another in their
respective pursuits to hold onto their talent.104 Dawson purported to have
only received an offer from his previous club—the Montreal Expos—
throughout the off-season.105 Wanting out of Montreal, Dawson
approached the Chicago Cubs during spring training and offered to accept
a salary that would be unilaterally determined by the club at a later date
without a contract.106 The Cubs signed Dawson to a contract with a base
salary of $500,000, which represented less than half of his previous
salary.107 Though Dawson was one of only two free agents to leave their
respective clubs in the [1986–1987] off-season, the MLB believed their
respective migrations were enough to offset the allegations of
collusion.108
99. Excerpts
From the Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, (Sep. 22, 1987)
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/22/sports/baseball-excerpts-from-the-ruling.html
[https://perma.cc/5A39-L4MX] (“The utilization or non-utilization of rights under this
Article XVIII is an individual matter to be determined solely by each Player and each
Club for his or its own benefit. Players shall not act in concert with other Players and
Clubs shall not act in concert with other Clubs.”).
100. See Willis, supra note 92, at 120.
101. See Rodenberg & Lovich, supra note 91, at 199.
102. See Willis, supra note 92, at 126.
103. Id. at 123.
104. Id. at 125.
105. Id. at 126.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Edelman, supra note 44, at 619 (noting that the MLB clubs argued that any
finding of collusion must be negated by the movement of free agent players Andre
Dawson and Lance Parrish each to new teams).
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A third grievance (“Collusion III”) was also filed by the MLBPA and
was likewise based on allegations of collusion in the free agent market
after the 1987 season.109 Though Collusion I was decided in favor of the
players, the free agent market remained quiet and unfruitful for the
players.110 Although many players received free agent offers, the offers
remained much lower than expected.111 At the same time, the club-owners
created an “Information Bank” that provided all teams with detailed
information about every contract offer made to a player throughout free
agency.112 As a result of every club obtaining intimate knowledge
regarding the demand for a player’s services, offers were likely to be
suppressed, as clubs had sizeable leverage in determining what the
player’s value to the league was.113 Of the seventy-six eligible free agents,
twelve received offers, and only three such offers led to a player switching
teams.114
In each respective grievance, the arbitrators ruled in favor of the
players.115 In finding for the players in Collusion I, the arbitrator clarified
the function of Article XVIII(H): “What is prohibited is a common
scheme involving two or more Clubs and/or two or more players
undertaken for the purpose of a common interest as opposed to their
individual benefit.”116 In finding for the players in Collusion II, the
arbitrator stated that action in the labor market was “meager,”117 and that
the clubs’ actions constituted uniform behavior, thus continuing the
collusive actions of the type in Collusion I.118 In finding for the players in
Collusion III, the arbitrator ruled that although there was no boycott
agreement in place, the collective use of the information bank was an
anticompetitive practice that restricted the labor market.119

109.
110.

See id. at 621.
See id. (specifying that even after Roberts’s stinging ruling, the free agent market
did not return to normal).
111. See Marc Edelman, Has Collusion Returned to Baseball? Analyzing Whether A
Concerted Increase in Free Agent Player Supply Would Violate Baseball’s “Collusion
Clause”, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 159, 167 (2004).
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Willis, supra note 92, at 122.
117. See id. at 125.
118. See id.
119. See Heitner & Postal, supra note 19, at 173.
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Though the players walked away with favorable rulings,120 these
grievances may have caused more harm than good because it resulted in
a rift of distrust between the club-owners and players.121 This distrust
naturally led to further accusations of collusion perpetrated by the clubowners.
Unsurprisingly, the continued hostilities resulted in a failure to agree
to terms on a new CBA in 1993, following the expiration of the previously
implemented deal.122 Subsequently, a number of unilateral changes were
implemented by the club-owners in the Basic Agreement, and these
changes were not received kindly by the players.123 The modifications
included eliminating aspects of the free agency system and salary
arbitration provisions of the since-expired CBA.124 Consequently, the
MLBPA filed an unfair labor grievance against the club-owners after the
players went on strike to protest the unilateral alterations to the Basic
Agreement.125 The District Court for the Southern District of New York
ruled in favor of the players, finding that the club-owners had
impermissibly effectuated a change to aspects of the CBA that needed to
be collectively bargained.126
After an injunction was issued and the players resumed work, many
of the issues that led to the lockout prevailed127 and the economic fallout

120. See id. at 173 (noting that the three collusion cases were settled for a sum of $280
million).
121. See generally Edelman, supra note 111, at 167–76.
122. See Alexandra Baumann, Play Ball: What Can Be Done To Prevent Strikes and
Lockouts in Professional Sports and Keep the Stadium Lights On, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 251, 292–93 (2012).
123. See Edelman, supra note 44, at 625 (“During the 1994 off-season, MLB clubowners further distanced themselves from the players by unilaterally implementing
various changes to the Basic Agreement . . .”).
124. See Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 880 F.
Supp. 246, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that the Board had reasonable cause to believe
that baseball club-owners committed unfair labor practices both by eliminating free
agency system and salary arbitration provisions of expired collective bargaining
agreement).
125. See id. at 252.
126. See id. at 253 (explaining that a unilateral change of an expired provision on a
mandatory topic, such as one involving wages, is an unfair labor practice, as it violates
the duty to bargain collectively in good faith).
127. See Seabury, supra note 77, at 370 (“With the issuing of the injunction, the
players went back to work, but nothing was solved.”).
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was severe.128 Ensuing negotiations for a new CBA that followed the
lockout led to heated debates regarding nearly every aspect of the
agreement.129
C. CONTEMPORARY ALLEGATIONS OF COLLUSION
& THEIR LACK OF SUCCESS
Despite prevailing contention between the club-owners and the
players, the league found its financial footing in the years following the
lockout.130 The free-agent market was as desirable as it had ever been for
players131—in large part due to the sport’s increasing revenues in an era
dominated by offensive production.132
Despite the fiscal benefits these years brought for the league, the
club-owners found themselves incapable of escaping allegations of
collusion once more. During the 2002 season, rumblings of a potential
strike began to surface yet again.133 When the 2002–2003 off-season
arrived, those rumblings only gained momentum, as the MLBPA acquired
information that identical bids were being submitted for certain free-agent
players.134
Notably, the evidence of collusive behavior in the 2002–2003 offseason did not carry the same level of transparency as previous collusion

128. See Moorad, supra note 20, at 83 (“[E]stimates placed the total cost of the strike
to both parties in the area of $1,000,000,000.”).
129. Edelman, supra note 46, at 625 (“The parties thereafter remained on poor terms,
unable to compromise on even topics of great social importance such as drug testing
procedure.”).
130. See Goodman, supra note 44, at 39 (After the strike the MLB was able to rebound
quickly; league revenue increased by nearly 20 percent each year between 1996 and
1999).
131. See id. at 40.
132. Id. at 39–40 (“Baseball’s financial growth during the late 1990s is attributed
largely to heightened fan interest because the players’ offensive production—particularly
batting average, home runs, and slugging percentage—increased dramatically.”).
133. See generally Jason Reid, Strike Date Could Be Coming, L.A. TIMES (July 6,
2002),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-jul-06-sp-labor06-story.html
[https://perma.cc/4VD2-SVFF].
134. Edelman, supra note 44, at 625–26 (“Although the MLBPA never made any of
its evidence publicly available, independent information compiled from newspaper
reports seems to indicate that certain players were receiving identical bids from multiple
teams.”).
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cases had.135 This lack of transparency did not negate the fact that some
questionable behavior was exhibited by the club-owners.136 A number of
teams released high-caliber players while stressing the need to slash
payroll.137 This sizably increased the number of players available in the
free-agent market, which diluted the value of individual players.138
Despite the suspect nature of league-wide behavior, the MLBPA was
awarded $12 million once it settled the case,139 a relatively minor sum in
comparison to the 1980s grievances, even though these players were left
in a similar position to that of the players in the 1980s grievances.140
Baseball’s latest collusion allegation that made its way through
litigation stems from what is an unlikely source on the surface. Barry
Bonds, often considered one of the greatest players in the history of the
sport,141 found himself unable to land gainful employment following the
2008 season.142 Bonds was still an incredibly productive player at fortythree years of age.143 However, by the time Bonds sought a new contract,
he found himself at the center of a performance enhancing drug (“PEDs”)
135. See id. at 626 (“Although the 2002-03 off-seasons did not seem to produce any
‘smoking gun’ invitation to collude, there were plenty of troublesome statements.”).
136. See Edelman, supra note 111, at 177 (referencing the questionable behaviors of
club-owners and staff of the Atlanta Braves, Boston Red Sox, Los Angeles Dodgers, and
New York Mets regarding the need to reduce payroll throughout the league).
137. See id. at 176–77.
138. See Murray Chass, Baseball Players See a Down Market but Smell Collusion,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/31/sports/baseballbaseball-players-see-a-down-market-but-smell-collusion.html [https://perma.cc/2HGC24P7] (“It has been that kind of winter for free agents . . . if they have secured jobs at all,
they have taken large pay cuts of a sort not seen since the collusion era of the 1980s.”).
139. Edelman, supra note 44, at 626.
140. See Edelman, supra note 111, at 183 (“[T]he economic effect of an agreement to
increase the number of available free agents seems similar to the effect of an agreement
not to sign other teams’ free agents.”).
141. See generally Kate Lombardo, A-Rod says Barry Bonds is greatest baseball
player of all-time, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.si.com/mlb/2015/
08/21/alex-rodriguez-barry-bonds-greatest-player-all-time
[https://perma.cc/ZF2NAETL]; see also Anthony Torrente, The Dark Side of Professional Baseball: The Fall of
Barry Bonds, 5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 352, 353 (2012) (“Bonds won seven Most Valuable
Player awards and appeared in 14 All-Star games in his illustrious career.”).
142. Torrente, supra note 141, at 354.
143. Id. at 358 (noting that Bonds hit 28 home runs, had a .276 batting average, a
slugging percentage of .565, and an on-base percentage of .480. Bonds’ statistics were
well above the 2007 MLB batting average of .268, on-base percentage of .336, and
slugging percentage of .422).
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scandal and had been indicted on four counts of perjury and one count of
obstruction of justice.144 Despite the PED allegations and the indictments,
many believed that Bonds should have been offered an MLB club contract
based on his tremendous on-the-field production, considering that he was
willing to play for the league minimum salary.145
In October 2008, the MLBPA announced it had evidence that clubs
acted in concert against signing Bonds, and therefore, Bonds was a victim
of the club-owners’ collusion.146 The MLBPA sought to engage in private
negotiations rather than filing a grievance, so Bonds did not file a
grievance until 2015.147 The arbitrator ruled against Bonds, failing to find
a “smoking gun.”148 Bonds’ best support for his cause was his statistical
resume.149 Though the previously successful collusion grievances in the
1980s also exclusively relied on circumstantial evidence, Bonds was
unsuccessful.150 His lack of further evidence made it reasonable for the
arbitrator to conclude that each club had independently decided not to
pursue Bonds, thereby not violating the Basic Agreement.151

144.
145.
146.

Heitner & Postal, supra note 19, at 180.
See id.
See THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Union Finds Collusion on Bonds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
16, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/17/sports/baseball/17bonds.html
[https://perma.cc/AV2E-BSTH].
147. Heitner & Postal, supra note 19, at 181.
148. Id. at 182.
149. See Jon Heyman, MLB prevails over Barry Bonds in collusion case over his
career ending, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/mlbprevails-over-barry-bonds-in-collusion-case-over-his-career-ending/
[https://perma.cc/YVQ4-3L6F?type=image] (noting that the basis of the case is believed
to have gone something like this: How many folks with a 1.045 on-base plus slugging
statistic (OPS) can’t get a job?).
150. Id.
151. See Michael McCann, Some Colin Kaepernick supporters are crying collusion,
but what does that really mean? SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 24, 2017),
https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/03/24/colin-kaepernick-protest-nfl-collusion-free-agency
[https://perma.cc/W467-FQC5] (“Therein rests a key point about collusion: There must
be actual evidence of conspiracy. In the 1980s, some baseball owners and team executives
took notes during meetings that later became evidence of collusion. If no such notes
exist—emails, texts, . . . admissions of witnesses, whatever it is—there must be evidence
that corroborates a player’s contention that he has been blackballed. A player merely
pointing out that he has been treated worse than players of similar abilities doesn’t prove
collusion. Teams are not obligated to sign anyone.”).
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D. THE CURT FLOOD ACT: AN UNTAPPED RESOURCE
Congress did not address the MLB’s impermeable antitrust
exemption until passing The Curt Flood Act in 1998.152 The CFA resulted
from a 1996 agreement between the club-owners and the MLBPA.153 Both
sides agreed to jointly petition Congress to repeal baseball’s antitrust
exemption to enable Major League players to file antitrust suits against
the league.154
Debate persists as to whether the repeal of the exemption was meant
to hold broader implications beyond merely enabling Major League
players to file antitrust suits.155 What is clear, however, is that the
exemption no longer applies to Major League players in regard to
conduct, acts, practices, or agreements directly relating to or affecting
their employment.156 Major League players are thus entirely capable of
breaking the league’s shield from antitrust liability through their nonstatutory labor exemption.157
To date, no Major League player or collection of Major League
players has attempted to utilize this legislation to their benefit in
combatting anticompetitive practices implemented by the league.158 Cases
that have attempted to penetrate baseball’s antitrust exemption through
the CFA have involved broadcasting restrictions,159 franchise

152. See Nathaniel Grow, Reevaluating the Curt Flood Act of 1998, 87 NEB. L. REV.
747, 748 (2009) (“Congress waited nearly eight decades before finally addressing MLB’s
longstanding antitrust exemption for the first time.”).
153. See Grow, supra note 50, at 872.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 894-900; see also Wyckoff v. Office of Com’r of Baseball, 138 S. Ct.
2621, 2622 (2018) (A case brought by two MLB scouts attempting to assert that the
league was suppressing the wages of scouts was unsuccessful).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(a) (2012) (“Subject to subsections (b) through (d), the conduct,
acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of organized professional major
league baseball directly relating to or affecting employment of major league baseball
players to play baseball at the major league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the
same extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would be subject to the antitrust
laws if engaged in by persons in any other professional sports business affecting interstate
commerce.”).
157. See 15 U.S.C. § 26b(c) (2012) (“Only a Major League baseball player has
standing to sue under this section.”).
158. See Grow, supra note 152, at 752.
159. See generally Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 56 F. Supp. 3d 280 (S.D.N.Y.
2014).
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relocation,160 and minor league players,161 each one of which has been
unsuccessful.162 Regardless, Major League players have the option to
break through the antitrust exemption carved out for them through the
CFA,163 provided they can demonstrate that the league is violating
antitrust law.
III. POTENTIAL WAYS TO SOLVE THE STAGNANT STATE OF THE FREE
AGENT MARKET
Even if club-owners are engaging in collusive behavior, pursuing a
collusion grievance against the club-owners would likely be a waste of
time. The league’s recent trend of collusion grievances—in addition to a
lack of overtly suppressive practices by the club-owners in the 2019 offseason—would likely work against the players in arbitration. This does
not mean that the players are without a means of recourse, however—the
players can break the veil of the league’s antitrust exemption through the
Curt Flood Act. The free-agent market is currently restraining trade,164
making this a viable alternative, while forcing club-owners to address
some of the inequities its current construction has generated.165
A. WHY PURSUING A COLLUSION GRIEVANCE WOULD PROBABLY BE
UNSUCCESSFUL
While baseball’s CBA lacks an explicit anti-collusion provision, the
“Individual Nature of Rights” clause has set forth the basic anti-collusion
provisions that players and clubs have been mandated to follow since
1976.166 Article XX(E) of the 2017–2021 Basic Agreement states as
follows:

160. See generally City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 776 F.3d
686 (9th Cir. 2015).
161. See generally Miranda v. Selig, 860 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2015).
162. See id.; see City of San Jose, 776 F.3d at 686; see also Laumann, 56 F. Supp. 3d
at 280.
163. See generally Grow, supra note 152.
164. See Goodman, supra note 46, at 44–45; see generally Brisbee, supra note 25.
165. See generally Patrick Kessock, Out of Service: Does Service Time Manipulation
Violate Major League Baseball’s Collective Bargaining Agreement?, 57 B.C. L. REV.
1367, 1382 (2016).
166. See Edelman, supra note 111, at 163.
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The utilization or non-utilization of rights under [the Consent to
Assignment and the Reserve System rules] is an individual matter to
be determined solely by each Player and each Club for his or its own
benefit. Players shall not act in concert with other Players and Clubs
shall not act in concert with other clubs.167

The league’s previous instances of collusion provide a framework
for analyzing whether there is a case to be made for another in the
aftermath of the 2018–2019 off-season.168 The MLBPA could and should
then consider as precedent the rulings in Collusion I, II, and III,169 as well
as the relatively unsuccessful grievances since then.170 Looking at
Collusion Grievances I, II, and III, the primary issue for a prospective
arbiter to consider is whether any agreement existed between the clubs to
avoid—or at least prolong—pursuing free agents in the 2002–2003 offseason long enough to drive their asking prices down.171
While the arbiters determined that implicit agreements amongst the
club-owners could be enough to constitute collusion under the Basic
Agreement in the first two collusion grievances,172 the realities of some
of the disincentives for pursuing free agents who are past their prime,173
would make the finding of such an implicit agreement highly unlikely.
During the off-seasons following the 1986 and 1987 seasons, free agents
did not leave their previous employers and the free agent market was
virtually non-existent, which is not the case for the majority of free agents
in 2019.174

167.
168.

See Major League Baseball, 2017-2021 Basic Agreement at Art. XX(E).
See Heitner & Postal, supra note 19, at 171 (“Baseball, unlike many other
professional sports, has a well-documented history of collusion and, although an
arbitrator is not required to follow precedent, the three proven instances of collusion can
provide guidance on the threshold burden a grievant must meet.”).
169. See Edelman, supra note 111, at 180.
170. See Willis, supra note 92, at 147.
171. See Edelman, supra note 111, at 180.
172. See id. at 180–81 (“In Collusion I, Arbitrator Roberts determined that an
agreement violating baseball’s collusion clause does not have to exist in writing.
Similarly, in Collusion II Arbitrator Nicolau determined that a “common scheme for
common benefit” is enough to establish collusion even without a writing or spoken
evidence.”).
173. See discussion supra Part II.B.
174. See generally Thomas Harrigan, 2018-19 Free agents by Position, MLB.COM
(Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.mlb.com/news/2019-mlb-free-agents-c293292274
[https://perma.cc/2W2H-TXTY].
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Therefore, the 2019 off-season more closely resembles the 2002–
2003 off-season than the 1980s off-seasons. The dilution of the market
with free agents over the age of thirty and the recognition that these free
agents are less valuable has often forced free agents to sign less-than-ideal
contracts, but no other circumstantial evidence would suggest there is a
“smoking gun” showing collusive actions by the club-owners.175
Likewise, the rationale used for Barry Bonds’ case translates here as well:
clubs are not obligated to sign particular players.
Jeff Borris, a thirty-one year-old player agent for the MLBPA—who
adamantly believes club-owners are colluding—correctly observed:
[T]here is no smoking gun, no directive from Commissioner Manfred
instructing clubs to limit their competition for free agents or to delay
signings until late in the off-season when players panic creating a
buyer’s market. One hundred years of trial and error has taught the
club-owners how to avoid getting caught.176

B. THE CURRENT CBA & HOW FREE AGENCY IS CURRENTLY
RESTRICTING TRADE
The current CBA binds players to their clubs for six seasons before
they can become eligible for free agency.177 Eligibility for free agency is
based on service time that is acquired only when playing at the Major
League level.178 If a player is promoted to an MLB club and remains on
its active roster for the entire season, he will have one full year of credited
service at the conclusion of that season.179
During a player’s first three seasons, he is paid the league’s
minimum salary.180 Once a player has been on a roster for three successive

175.
176.

See Edelman, supra note 111, at 184.
See Zach Seybert Continued Collusion Predicted for 2018-19 MLB Free Agent
Class–Jeff
Borris,
SPORTS
AGENT
BLOG
(Nov.
11,
2018),
http://sportsagentblog.com/2018/11/08/guest-post-continued-collusion-predicted-for2018-19-mlb-free-agent-class-jeff-borris/ [https://perma.cc/6MCN-KYXC].
177. See Major League Baseball, 2017-2021 Basic Agreement at Art. XX(B)(1)
(“Following the completion of the term of his Uniform Player’s Contract, any Player with
6 or more years of Major League service who has not executed a contract for the next
succeeding season shall become a free agent . . . .”).
178. See id.
179. Id. at Art. XXI.
180. Id. at Art. VI(A) (indicating that players make the minimum annual salary until
they are arbitration-eligible after they have three years of service time).
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seasons, he becomes eligible for salary arbitration.181 During arbitration,
both the club and player each present a dollar figure to an independent
arbiter, who then decides for the player or the club based on comparable
players’ salaries.182
After three years of arbitration, any player with six or more years of
service time who has not executed a contract for the following season can
become a free agent.183 However, before a player can become a free agent,
his former club has the ability to extend a qualifying offer.184 A qualifying
offer is “a one-year Uniform Player’s Contract for the next succeeding
season with a guaranteed salary that is equal to the average salary of the
highest-paid players each year.”185 If the player accepts the qualifying
offer, he is signed for the next season.186 However, if the player rejects his
former club’s qualifying offer and elects to become a free agent, his
former club is compensated with a draft pick in Baseball’s amateur
draft.187
Free agency, as currently constructed, is restraining trade in myriad
ways. Because players earn significantly larger sums once they are
eligible for arbitration, club-owners and general managers are
incentivized to prevent players from becoming eligible for as long as
possible.188 Consequently, players are often held in the minor leagues in
order to prevent their service time clock from starting, so that they will
only play in the Major League when they can provide what is perceived
to be optimal production during their “prime years.”189

181.
182.

See at Art. VI(E).
See id. (stating that the arbitrator must choose either the player’s salary proposal
or the team’s salary proposal because he “shall be limited to awarding only one or the
other of the two figures submitted”).
183. Id. at Art. XX(B).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See Kessock, supra note 165, at 1382 (“[S]alaries agreed upon during or in
advance of salary arbitration generally constitute a significant increase over the nearminimum salaries paid pre-arbitration. MLB teams, therefore, have an incentive to keep
a player from salary arbitration eligibility for as long as possible.”).
189. See generally Travis Sawchick, Nobody Wants Baseball’s 30-Something Free
Agents Anymore, FIVE THIRTY EIGHT (Nov. 8, 2018), https://fivethirtyeight.com/
features/nobody-wants-baseballs-30-something-free-agents-anymore%F0%9F%98%9E/ [https://perma.cc/C8VN-SY4Y].
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Kris Bryant, of the Chicago Cubs, is the perfect example of a victim
of service time manipulation. Bryant, the second overall pick in the 2013
MLB draft, put up phenomenal statistics while in the Cubs’ minor league
system during the limited time he was there.190 Despite his success, he
was left off the Major League roster to start the 2015 season.191 A decision
that surprised few—if any—in the industry was Bryant being left off the
Major League roster initially, yet he was “called up” to that roster within
two weeks after the start of the 2015 season.192 The Cubs’ reasons for
doing so were strictly financial, as keeping Bryant in the minor leagues
for those two weeks gave the team an extra year of control, thus delaying
Bryant’s free agency and eligibility to arbitrate for another year.193
Manipulation of service time directly ties into the second principal
issue with free agency: players are placed on the open market past their
window of greatest production.194 Players’ performance peaks as they
reach their late twenties.195 Both physical ability and performance decline
when the average player crosses the thirty-year-threshold.196 The average
age for first year players (“rookies”) breaking into the Major League in
2005–2009 was 24.4 for position players and 25.3 for pitchers,197 meaning
that most players which make it to free agency do so on the wrong side of
thirty.
Looking at the production value for players through the game’s most
popular metric, Wins Above Replacement (“WAR”),198 the 2017–2018
off-season average age of thirty-two has significantly decreased the
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192.
193.
194.
195.
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197.

See Kessock, supra note 165, at 1368.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1367, 1370.
See Goodman, supra note 46, at 44-45.
Id. at 44.
Id.
See Travis Sawchik, Nobody Wants Baseball’s 30-Something Free Agents
Anymore, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 8, 2018), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
nobody-wants-baseballs-30-something-free-agents-anymore-%F0%9F%98%9E/
[https://perma.cc/BNN3-V5QM].
198. See Tom Van Riper, Baseball’s Most Overpaid Players, FORBES (July 10, 2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomvanriper/2014/07/10/baseballs-most-overpaidplayers-2/#7584377653e9 [https://perma.cc/U5WD-D6B7] (indicating that WAR is now
a widely accepted statistic that analyzes both offensive and defensive metrics to
determine the number of wins a player contributes to his club and outlining the most
overpaid players in MLB based on their WAR).
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production value brought to the league.199 Consequently, teams have
recognized that there is a disincentive in allocating their resources on free
agents past their prime years of production.200 Instead, teams are choosing
to invest their resources (1) through the MLB amateur draft, (2) on
international free agents, and (3) by signing their young players to longterm contract extensions through their prime years.201
Additionally, free agency has restricted players’ employment
opportunities through its implementation of the Qualifying Offer. When
a player rejects a Qualifying Offer, clubs are forced to choose between
signing that free agent and forfeiting at least one valuable draft pick.202
The cases of former free agent pitchers Dallas Keuchel and Craig Kimbrel
emblemize the negative repercussions of extending a pending free agent
the Qualifying Offer. Both players began the 2019 season without a
contract and subsequently did not receive one until June, two months into
the season, largely so that their new clubs would not forfeit draft pick
compensation once they were signed.203
While the CFA unquestionably gives Major League players the right
to pursue antitrust litigation against the league, the restraint imposed by
the league should be considered unreasonable under the Sherman Act. By
definition, collusion under Baseball’s CBA is not quite identical to
collusion under U.S. antitrust laws.204 However, cases asserting collusion
199. See Sawchick, supra note 197 (noting that during the 2017–2018 season, position
players aged 32 and older accounted for 12.9 percent of WAR and 18.6 percent of plate
appearances, which were the lowest numbers that demographic have contributed since
1975 and 1979).
200. See id.
201. See Goodman, supra note 46, at 45.
202. See Qualifying Offer, MLB.COM, http://m.mlb.com/glossary/transactions/
qualifying-offer [https://perma.cc/4ZBC-3S4X] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019) (“Any team
that signs a player who has rejected a qualifying offer is subject to the loss of one or more
Draft picks. While a team's highest first-round pick is exempt from forfeiture, any
additional first-round picks are eligible.”).
203. See generally Michael Clair, The best closer of the last decade just signed and
he’s going to cause chaos in the NL Central, CUT4: MLB.COM (June 7, 2019),
https://www.mlb.com/cut4/craig-kimbrel-signed-with-the-cubs [https://perma.cc/S4XUBCVX]; see also Victor Mather, Dallas Keuchel Is Returning to the Majors as an Atlanta
Brave, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/07/
sports/baseball/dallas-keuchel-braves.html [https://perma.cc/D4L8-2DX7].
204. See Marc Edelman, Barry Bonds Collusion Grievance Had Merit, Despite
Outcome, FORBES (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman
/2015/08/28/barry-bonds-collusion-grievance-had-merit-despiteoutcome/#2e637717aa57 [https://perma.cc/9XWY-M2ZZ].
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in baseball are often successful on grounds that are substantially similar
to cases dealing with collusion in non-baseball antitrust cases.205
Since free agency has been collectively bargained for by the MLBPA
and the club-owners, it is unlikely that the players could utilize the per se
test in demonstrating how free agency is currently restraining trade.206
Likewise, since the league is a joint venture—the per se rule would not
likely be permissible.207 Therefore, the rule of reason test would apply in
such litigation.
The rule of reason analysis attempts to determine whether the
restraint imposed (1) is justified by legitimate business purposes, and (2)
is no more restrictive than necessary.208 The inquiry is confined to a
consideration of the impact on competitive conditions in the
marketplace.209 The rule of reason thus requires the factfinder to decide
whether under all the circumstances the agreement imposes an
unreasonable restraint on competition.210
The anti-competitive aspects of service time manipulation that
disables players from reaching free agency until they are in their thirties
is undeniable and has led to the stagnant state of free agency today.
However, the utilization of such restrictive measures is also a fundamental
aspect of professional sports leagues.211 By the same token, there are
alternative measures to the way the free-agent market is currently
constructed that would be less restrictive on players’ ability to capitalize
when their market value is at its peak.
One way this can be accomplished is by implementing a restricted
free agency—a hotly debated topic of discussion when the club-owners
unilaterally implemented it the 1994 season.212 As proposed then,
205. See id. (“Under antitrust law, mere parallel behavior among competitors is not
enough to trigger a violation. But, parallel behavior along with a plus factor is
sufficient.”).
206. See Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976).
207. See id. (finding that when an alleged restraint of trade does not completely
eliminate competition for players’ services, use of the per se rule is inappropriate).
208. See discussion supra, Section II.A.
209. Nat’l Soc’y. of Prof’l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978).
210. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387
(9th Cir. 1984).
211. See generally Brisbee, supra note 25.
212. See generally Murray Chass, Increased Free Agents Will Come With Cap, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 27, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/27/sports/baseball-notebookincreased-free-agents-will-come-with-cap.html
[https://perma.cc/7HM9-S8GR].
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restricted free agency would be implemented after a player serves four
years in the league. Thereafter, he would become a restricted free agent,
meaning that though other clubs could offer him a contract, his current
club can retain his rights by matching the highest offer on the market.213
Restricted free agency could create a gateway to accumulating greater
returns for players by entering the open market earlier, while providing
club-owners with the option of holding on to those players.
Another less restrictive alternative would be to enable players to
reach free agency after four years of Major League service.214 This
method would curb the number of free agents who find themselves past
the age of thirty years-old on the market, and would force front offices to
be more competitive by bidding on players with larger windows of
production ahead of them.
CONCLUSION
The MLB has been an intricate aspect of American culture since the
late nineteenth century. Neither the players nor club-owners want to see
a work stoppage. If one occurs, the consequences could be fiscally
catastrophic. Therefore, any means necessary to prevent such a stoppage
need to be considered.
Only a handful of players are able to remain productive at such ages
in a league buoyed by great young talent. Club-owners’ continued
manipulation of player service time is restraining trade and inherently
violates antitrust laws. In order to receive just compensation, the players
and the MLBPA should pursue alternatives such as reducing player
service time required for free agency or establishing restricted free
agency. The tangible threat of antitrust litigation should be enough to
bring both the club-owners and the players to the bargaining table, and
therefore, facilitate an agreement that will leave both sides, as well as
millions of fans, satisfied.
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214.

See Goodman, supra note 46, at 46.
See id. at 55 (“The present system distorts the market by suppressing labor costs
initially and then giving players effectively one shot at a significant contract.”).

